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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
POINT I 
APPELLEES' RELIANCE ON COLLINS V. WILSON, IS MISPLACED 
BECAUSE THE "CONTINUOUS NEGLIGENT TREATMENT" 
APPLIES TO THE PRESENT CASE, 
The Appellees mistake the continuing negligence rule for the continuing 
negligent treatment rule. The latter applies in this case, the former does not. The appropriate 
standard which has been the law in Utah for 75 years is that when a physician is continuously 
negligent during a course of medical tiraimcnl tlir cause of action h m negligence accrues 
after the last negligent act. See Brief of Appellants, Point I, see also feteler v. Robison, 17 
P.2d 244 (Utah 1932). In the present case, the only evidence is that Appellees provided 
negligent treatment over months of office visits. R 1 1 1 1 1 116 This course of treatment 
is the basis of the negligence claim and under the continuous negligent treatment rule the 
negligence action does not accrue until the last negligent act. See Brief of Appellants, Point 
I. In their brief, Appellees confuse die continuous negligent treatment rule with the 
continuing treatment rule, which is not the law in Utah. The latter rule delays the accrual of 
the claim where there was a singular act of negligence followed by non-negligent treatment. 
Appellees rely on Collins v. Wilson , 1999 UT 56, 984 P.2d 960 for the 
proposition that Appellants' negligence claim did not accrue in April, 2003. Appellees' 
Brief, p. 22-24. In Collins, the plaintiff was referred to the defendant surgeon for surgery to 
treat his ulcer related problems. Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, 984 P.2d at 962. 
Postoperatively, the plaintiff suffered severe complications but received no further treatment 
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from the defendant surgeon. Id. Instead, he received follow-up care from other physicians. 
Id. Almost 4 years after the surgery, the plaintiff filed a notice of intent naming the 
defendant surgeon and the hospital where the surgery was performed claiming inter alia that 
the surgeon had been negligent in performing the surgery. Id. After suit was filed, the 
defendants moved for summary judgment claiming that the claims were time-barred. Id. The 
motion was denied and the defendant surgeon moved for a bifurcated trial regarding the 
issues of fact relating to the statute of limitations. Id. at 963. At trial, the trial court refused 
to give a jury instruction on the "continuous treatment rule" and the jury returned a verdict 
for the defendants on the issue of the statute of limitations. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff 
claimed that the failure to give the instruction was reversible error. Id. at 964. The Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that the "continuous treatment rule" did not apply because the 
defendant had not provided treatment beyond the initial surgery. Id. More importantly, the 
court reaffirmed its adoption of the "continuous negligent treatment rule" as initially declared 
in the Peteler decision. Id. at fn. 9. It reaffirmed its ruling in Peteler as follows: 
Collins also notes, and we agree, that Utah courts have addressed a similar 
doctrine; namely, the "continuous negligent treatment" rule. See, e.g. Peteler 
v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932). The continuous negligent 
treatment rule addresses a course of treatment that is allegedly negligent. The 
entire negligent course of treatment constitutes a single cause of action and, as 
such, the statute of limitations would not begin to run until the completion of 
the act giving rise to the cause of action, i.e., the negligent course of treatment. 
Such is not the case here, "where the only negligence alleged was the negligent 
and unskillful operation . . . and nothing more." Peteler, 81 Utah at 549, 17 
P.2d at 249. 
Id. at fn. 9 (italics as in original). The distinction between the two doctrines is that under the 
"continuous treatment rule" the statute would begin to run only after the conclusion of the 
-2-
course of treatment even if the continuing course of treatment was not negligent. Id. at 963. 
In contrast, the "continuous negligent treatment rule" as explained supra requires that the 
course of treatment itself be negligent. 
Appellees were negligent in their course of treatment. A clear distinction 
between the present case and the case in Collins is that here, Appellees gave negligent 
treatment over a period of months that injured the Appellants. The only evidence before the 
Court is that the original surgical procedure was performed within the standard of care. 
There was no indication that the surgeon was negligent or that the complications had 
anything to do with Mrs. Harper's eventual complete loss of urinary function. R. 112. The 
only negligence was that the course of follow-up treatment was negligently provided. R. 
116. The record shows that Appellees treated Mrs. Harper on eight different occasions and 
on all eight occasions, they failed to provide her with appropriate care for her retained urine 
volumes. R. 116 (visits on November 25, 2002; December 2, 2002; December 16, 2002; 
January 4, 2003; February 25, 2003; March 19, 2003; and April 7,2003). On each of these 
occasions, Appellees failed to observe the standard of care by failing to provide a catheter 
to relieve retained urine. By omitting this necessary treatment, the bladder distension 
increased in severity to the point that Mrs. Harper lost her urinary function. Peteler v. 
Robison, 17 P.2d 244, 249 (Utah 1932). In contrast, the plaintiff in Collins, received no 
ongoing continuous care from the defendant surgeon and so, as the court ruled in that case, 
he could not claim that either of the two rules. Id. at fn. 9. 
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Considering these distinguishing factors, the Court should find that the 
"continuous negligent treatment rule" applies in this case. 
POINT II 
ADOPTING THE "ONE ACTION RULE" IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS 
CASE WOULD OVERTURN THE STANDARD IN FOIL V. 
BALLINGER. 
Appellees contend that because Appellants had reason to know of their cause 
of action for failure to obtain informed consent (hereinafter "FOIC") that the statute of 
limitations had commenced on all other claims against the doctor, even including his 
subsequent negligence in providing follow-up care. Brief of Appellees, p. 16. They argue 
that it does not matter if there was negligence involved so long as, "Mrs. Harper is aware of 
some harm, regardless of whether she believes it is temporary or permanent." Brief of 
Appellees, p. 16; Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). The Court must refuse 
to apply the "one action rule" under these circumstances because doing so would overturn 
the long-standing precedent in Foil v. Ballinger; use of the rule to take away the second 
prong of Foil test undermines the physician patient relationship; and there is no precedent 
to support this novel and reckless application of the rule. 
A. Applying the "one action rule" would overturn Foil v. Ballinger. 
Nearly thirty years ago, the Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion in Foil v. 
Ballinger. The rule in the case set the standard to guide courts in interpreting the discovery 
rule in Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-4. Specifically, the court ruled that a cause of action 
in a medical malpractice case does not accrue until after the patient discovers she has 
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suffered a legal injury." Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144,147 (Utah 1979). The court ruled 
that it was not enough for the patient to have knowledge of some physical injury, but that she 
had to know or have reason to know that the physical injury was caused by negligence. Id. 
The court stated the rule as follows: 
[T]he two-year provision [of § 78-14-4] does not commence to run until the 
injured person knew or should have known that he had sustained an injury and 
that the injury was caused by negligent action. 
Id. at 148. This rule has been reiterated by the court in the intervening years. In each case, 
the supreme court has reemphasized that the element of knowledge of the negligent cause of 
the injury is essential to discovery of the legal injury. See Medved v. Glenn, 125 P.3d 913, 
917 (Utah 2005), Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 82 P.3d 1076, 1090 (Utah 2003), Andreini 
v. Hultgren, 860P.2d916,919 (Utah 1993), Floyd v. Western Surgical Assoc, Inc., 113 P.2d 
401,404 (Utah 1989), Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp., 754 P.2d 933, fn. 1 (Utah 1988), Brower 
v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337,1339 (Utah 1987), Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 
1980). As the court discussed in Foil, there are strong policy reasons to construe the term 
injury to include a knowledge that the injury was caused by negligence. 
B. Abolishing the knowledge of negligence element would hamper 
medical practice and the patient-physician relationship. 
The supreme court has found that knowledge of negligence requirement is 
essential because of the disparity between patients and providers, the need to avoid 
unnecessary lawsuits, and to discourage concealment of negligence by providers. First, there 
is a great disparity of medical knowledge between patients without medical training and 
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healthcare providers. The Foil court noted that patients usually have no way to know if a 
disability or dysfunction is merely a side-effect or was caused by negligence. Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 P.2d at 147. Indeed, the vast majority of patients suffer pain and physical 
disability without understanding or even suspecting the true cause. Id. Accordingly, it would 
be unjust to expect a patient to discover that her injury was attributable to negligence where 
the cause is unclear and the act of negligence unknown. Id. Second, to allow a malpractice 
claim to accrue only when the patient discovers her physical injury would encourage the 
patient who suffers pain, dysfunction, or disability without knowledge of its cause to file a 
lawsuit against the health care provider to prevent expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. 
at 148. Of course, this result contradicts the purpose of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act 
which is to prevent the filing of unjustified lawsuits against health care providers. Id. Third, 
abrogating the legal injury rule may encourage some health care providers to keep the patient 
in the dark concerning the true cause of the physical injury with the expectation that the 
statute of limitations will expire before the patient that the injury was caused by negligence. 
Id. For all of these reasons, the Court must refuse Appellees' invitation to adopt the "one 
action rule" to bar negligence claims where the patient discovers her legal injury later. 
Application of the "one action rule" is particularly unfair when applied to the 
Appellant, Mrs. Harper. Under the Appellees' analysis, if Appellants should have known of 
the FOIC claim then the statute of limitations would commence for any and all actions 
however tangentially related to the surgeries. As a result, even though Appellees' only 
-6-
negligence occurred in the months following the surgery and Appellant could not have 
learned of it until 10 months after the surgery, the Appellees would bar the negligence claim. 
This would have forced the Appellants to file all claims that they could ever anticipate 
against the Appellees even though the negligence upon which they were based had not yet 
occurred. At the first hint of trouble, i.e. the failure to obtain informed consent, the 
Appellants would have to begin claims for any other conceivable harm that the Appellees 
could be responsible for. The result offends the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and the 
policy considerations stated in Foil by forcing Appellants to file all claims they could 
anticipate coming from the surgeries even before those claims had accrued. 
C. Application of the "one action rule" in this case is novel and reckless. 
There is no precedent that supports this application of the "one action rule" 
as Appellees propose and it should be rejected by the Court. The "one action rule" has only 
been applied in cases where a defendant's negligence caused present and possible future 
damages. In Medved v. Glenn, 2005 UT 77, 125 P.3d 913, (cited by the Appellees in their 
brief on page 17) the plaintiff sought recovery for extensive cancer treatment and for possible 
future treatment after the defendant doctor failed to diagnose her breast cancer. Id. at f 5. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the damages associated with "having to undergo more 
extensive cancer treatment than [the patient] would have undergone had her cancer been 
timely diagnosed" constituted " a legally cognizable injury," and allowed the patient to 
pursue her present and future damages under the "one action rule." Id. at f l 14,18, see also, 
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Snow v. Irion, 2005 UT App 521, ^ [8 (holding that plaintiff could bring action for future 
possible damages where she suffered an actionable injury with present damages). The court 
explained that the "one action rule" permits the injured plaintiff to bring suit to recover all 
damages resulting from the same legal injury. Id. at l^ 14 (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 912 cmt. e (1979)).1 The "one action rule" as adopted in Utah governs the duty of 
a plaintiff to seek all damages that stem from a particular cause of action and does not relate 
to the discovery rule at all. 
The "one action rule" has no bearing on the issue of whether Appellants 
discovered their injury and that it was likely caused by negligence. Its application to bar the 
Appellants' case would be erroneous. Here, the only evidence before the Court is that the 
Appellees could not have been negligent in the performance of the surgery, rather all of the 
evidence shows that the Appellee, Dr. Evans was negligent in his ongoing treatment of Mrs. 
Harper's bladder complications (residual urine volumes) during months of follow-up care. 
R. at 111 - 14, 116. There was no injury caused by negligence during the surgery. Id. 
Consequently, for the Appellees to seek dismissal of the negligence claim because the cause 
of the residual urine volumes occurred during the surgery misinterprets the two-prong test 
in Foil, and erroneously mutates the "one action rule" into an alternative to the Foil standard. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should find that the "one action rule does 
not apply in this case and that there are issues of material fact as to the date that Appellants 
1
 See Addendum, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912 (1979). 
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discovered their injury. The judgment below should be reversed and the case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
POINT III 
APPELLEES' RELIANCE ON DUERDEN V. UTAH VALLEYHOSR, IS 
MISPLACED AS THE CASE IS READILY DISTINGUISHABLE, 
Appellees' reliance on the U.S. District Court's ruling in Duerden v. Utah 
Valley Hosp., 663 F. Supp. 781,782 (D. Utah 1987)2 is misplaced. They argue that the facts 
in Duerden are similar to the facts in the case at hand. See Brief of Appellees at p. 15. 
However, a review of the Duerden ruling reveals that the court was only asked to determine 
whether the first prong of the Foil test - did the plaintiff know that there was a physical 
injury - was met in that case.3 There, the plaintiff was hospitalized during the birth of one 
of her children. After the birth, she experienced difficulty urinating and a nurse negligently 
attempted to apply a urinary catheter without success. Id. at 781 - 82. After some time 
passed, another nurse applied a catheter and returned a volume of urine that was 
approximately three times normal. On the same day, the plaintiff's doctor informed her that 
the initial catheter was placed negligently and that her bladder had become distended. Id. 
She was advised, however, that the condition would be temporary. Id. Later, she was 
2Appellants note that Duerden v. Utah Valley Hosp., 663 F. Supp. 781,782 (D. Utah 
1987) is a ruling on summary judgment by the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah and 
is not binding precedent on this Court. 
3The second prong of the Foil test was not at issue because the defendants stipulated 
that the procedure was performed negligently. Duerden v. Utah Valley Hosp., 663 F. Supp. 
781, 782 (D.Utah 1987). 
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advised that the condition was permanent and she filed suit. Id. After the jury awarded a 
verdict for the plaintiff, the defendants made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict claiming the case was not timely filed. Id. at 782. The plaintiff countered that she 
had only sought recovery for her permanent bladder injury - a diagnosis she did not learn of 
until two years after she suffered her injury. Id. at 783. The issue was whether knowledge 
of the temporary injury was sufficient for accrual of the malpractice claim where the 
permanency of the injury was diagnosed 2 years later. Id. The district court granted 
defendants' motion finding that the patient did not need to know that the injury was 
permanent for it to be a legally cognizable injury. Id. at 785. 
The facts in Duerden differ substantially from those in the case at bar. 
Contrary to the Appellees' assertions, the rule and facts in Duerden are readily 
distinguishable from the case at hand. Here, the only evidence before the court is that the 
initial complication which caused Mrs. Harper to retain residual urine volumes was not 
caused by negligence. Rather, it was a known difficulty of the surgeries that she underwent. 
R. 116. Under the undisputed facts, the only legal injury possible was Appellees' continuous 
negligent treatment by failing to provide catheterization over a period of months. Id. It was 
this injury by continual urine retention which caused her total loss of urinary function. Id. 
There is no contrary evidence in the record. 
The patient in Duerden learned of the negligence at the same time she 
learned of the injury. Another distinguishing point is that the injury in Duerden occurred 
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on the same day the plaintiff learned it was caused by negligence. Duerden, 663 F. Supp. at 
781-2. In the present case, the undisputed facts show that the injury took place over a period 
of months and that Appellants did not learn it was caused by negligence until approximately 
5 months after the last negligent treatment. R. I l l - 14, 116. Appellees have failed to 
produce any contradictory evidence. These two facts make the opinion in Duerden 
inapplicable to the present case. 
POINT IV 
APPELLEES MISCONSTRUE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-14-8 
AS TO RENDER THE TOLLING PROVISIONS IN § 78-14-12 
SUPERFLUOUS. THIS VIOLATES THE RULES OF STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION. 
Appellees' interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-8 is erroneous 
because it would render the tolling provisions of § 78-14-12 superfluous. To construe both 
sections in harmony with each other, as required by the canons of statutory construction, § 
78-14-8 must be interpreted as an extension of the time to file the complaint which 
complements the tolling provisions of § 78-14-12. When engaging in statutory construction 
'"[the court] look[s] first to the plain language of the statute to discern the legislative intent.'" 
City ofS. Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
The court also follows the rule "that a statute should not be construed in a piecemeal fashion 
but as a comprehensive whole." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037,1045 (Utah 
1991). Thus, the court reads the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interprets its 
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. State v. 
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Schofield, 2002 UT 132,18, 63 P.3d 667, cert, denied, 540 U.S. 820 (2003). The court also 
"avoid[s] interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." 
Hall v. Utah State Dep't ofCorr., 2001 UT 34,115, 24 P.3d 958 (emphasis added). 
In the case under review, Appellees argue that § 78-14-8 must be read to grant 
an extension to file the lawsuit for 120 days "from the date of service of the notice."4 Brief 
of Appellees, p. 9. They interpret this to mean that there is no tolling of the statute of 
limitations under § 78-14-12 during the extension. This argument ignores the provisions of 
§ 78-14-12 which grant a tolling of the statute of limitations from the time that the request 
for prelitigation is filed until the end of jurisdiction of the prelitigation process.5 Brief of 
Appellees, p. 9. The conflict between § 78-14-8 and § 78-14-12 becomes apparent when a 
claimant files a Notice of Intent and a Request for Prelitigation Panel Hearing on the same 
day within 90 days of the expiration of the statute of limitations. For the number of days 
4 
Section 78-14-8, quoted in pertinent part as follows: 
If the notice is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable 
time period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care 
provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice. 
Section 78-14-12(3)(a), quoted as follows: 
(3) (a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this section tolls the 
applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 60 days following the division's 
issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60 days following the termination 
of jurisdiction by the division as provided in this subsection. The division shall send 
any opinion issued by the panel to all parties by regular mail. 
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before the expiration of the statute that the documents are filed, the tolling provision ~ under 
Appellees' interpretation - becomes superfluous because the extension would encompass 
those days. Brief of Appellees, p. 9. This interpretation violates the rules of statutory 
construction by making the tolling provision superfluous. Hall v. Utah State Dep't ofCorr., 
2001 UT 34,115, 24 P.3d 958. Appellees' construction of § 78-14-8 also deprives the 
claimant of the benefit of the tolling provision for the days before the statute expires. To 
render both sections meaningful and in harmony with one another, § 78-14-8 should be 
construed to count the tolled days during the extension period (days before the expiration of 
the statute after the service of the Request and Notice) as added to the time tolled by § 78-14-
12. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Appellants filed their Notice of 
Claim and their Request for Prelitigation Panel Review on November 4, 2004. Accepting, 
for the sake of argument that the statute of limitations expired on November 17,2002, under 
§ 78-14-12, the statute of limitations was tolled for an additional 13 days. If § 78-14-8 did 
not come into play, those 13 days would be added to the time to file the Complaint when the 
statute began to run again after the prelitigation panel concluded. Russell Packard Dev., Inc. 
v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, f 31. In this case, that would mean that, again accepting the 
Appellees' reckoning, thirteen days would be added to the prelitigation time and the tolling 
would end on September 28, 2005 (limitations period tolled for the time DOPL has 
jurisdiction plus 63 days plus the additional 13 days). Using Appellees accounting (see brief 
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of Appellees, pp. 8-9), the 120 day extension would be added at that point which would make 
the statute of limitations expire on January 26,2006 or 9 days after the Complaint was filed. 
If reconciling the 120 day extension under § 78-14-8 first, the date to file the 
complaint would be extended to March 3,2005. From that date, adding the number of days 
the statute was tolled under the prelitigation process (329 days) would mean that the statute 
of limitations expired on January 26, 2006 - again, 9 days after the Complaint was filed. 
It is only by rendering the tolling provision in § 78-14-12 superfluous that the 
Appellees are able to reach the conclusion that the limitations period expired before the filing 
of the Complaint. This violates the rules of statutory construction and should be rejected by 
the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellants respectfully request a reversal of the 
order entering summary judgment below and remand for further proceedings. If the Court 
finds that material facts exist as to either Points I or II in Appellant's first brief, it should 
remand with an instruction to submit the question of fact regarding the statute of limitations 
to the jury. If the Court finds for the Appellants on Point III, then it should rule as a matter 
of law that the case was timely filed and remand for further proceedings. 
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DATED AND SUBMITTED this 1st day of June, 2007. 
Cory B Mattsoa^ttorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief was served upon 
Appellee's counsel at the address listed below, by depositing the same in the United States 
mail, postage pre-paid on the / * day of June, 2007. 
Attorney for Defendant 
Robert G. Wright 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
PO Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
Q \Admin^Tory\Harpcr Appellant's Reply brief wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
Addendum : Restatement (Second) of Torts, §912(1979). 
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SECOND 
TORTS 2d 
Volume 4 
§§ 708-End 
-Jt6 -Jtdopted and (-^romulaated 
BY 
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 
AT WASHINGTON, I). C. 
May 19, 1977 
ST. PAUL, MINN. 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PUBLISHERS 
1979 
§ 911 TORTS SECOND Ch. 47 
k. Value with reference to time. As stated in § 927, a per-
son deprived of property may have an election to determine the 
time at which the value is to be fixed; and this is important in 
cases in which its value has fluctuated, either because similar 
articles have fluctuated in value, or because the condition or 
known properties of the subject matter have changed. Thus 
when the defendant has converted the plaintiff's shares in a cor-
poration, the plaintiff may be entitled to the value at a time sub-
sequent to that at the time of conversion. Likewise, the value 
of the subject matter may be affected by external events, such 
as the likelihood at a particular time that a railroad will ap-
proach a particular piece of land, which may be either a depreci-
ating or an appreciating factor. So a lottery ticket, if the tickets 
are legal, may vary in value from the current price of five dollars 
before the drawing to $100,000 or nothing after the drawing. In 
the same way a growing crop may be worth $1000 immediately 
preceding a period of drought and worth nothing immediately 
afterwards, or a tract of land thought to contain oil may lose its 
value when a dry well is bored. (See § 929, Comment a ) . In 
these cases the value of the subject matter, as the basis for recov-
ery of damages, depends upon the time at which the plaintiff is 
entitled to fix the completion of the tort. It should be noted, 
however, that in accordance with the rule stated in S 927, in 
many of these cases the plaintiff is entitled to obtain, not merely 
the value of the subject matter at a particular time, but also any 
additional damages that may result from the defendant's act, in-
cluding, in some cases, profits that would have been made from 
the sale or use of the property. 
§ 9 1 2 . Certainty 
One to whom another has tortiously caused harm is 
entitled to compensatory damages for the harm if, but 
only if, he establishes by proof the extent of the harm 
and the amount of money representing adequate com-
pensation with as much certainty as the nature of the 
tort and the circumstances permit. 
Comment: 
a. When one seeks to recover damages for a particular harm 
that he claims has resulted to his person or to a tangible thing 
belonging to him, he has the burden of proving that the other 
has invaded a legally protected interest of his, that he has suf-
fered the harm and that the act of the other was a legal cause 
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of the harm. Thus when a person has been wounded by another 
and subsequently blood poisoning develops in any portion of his 
body, he has the burden of showing that it is more probable than 
not that the initial wrongful contact was a substantial factor in 
producing the malady. So when one has been libeled and seeks 
to prove as a basis for special damages the loss of a particular 
marriage, he has the burden of establishing that the publication 
of the libel was a substantial factor in preventing the marriage. 
In all of these cases the recovery of damages for a particular 
harm is dependent upon proof that the harm occurred as the re-
sult of the tortious conduct, and normally the plaintiff can re-
cover damages for the harm only by proving this with the same 
degree of certainty as that required in proving the existence of 
the cause of action. 
There is, however, no general requirement that the injured 
person should prove with like definiteness the extent of harm 
that he has suffered as a result of the tortfeasor's conduct. It is 
desirable that responsibility for harm should not be imposed 
until it has been proved with reasonable certainty that the 
harm resulted from the wrongful conduct of the person charged. 
It is desirable, also, that there be definiteness of proof of the 
amount of damage as far as is reasonably possible. It is even 
more desirable, however, that an injured person not be deprived 
of substantial compensation merely because he cannot prove with 
complete certainty the extent of harm he has suffered. Particu-
larly is this true in situations where there can not be any real 
equivalence between the harm and compensation in money, as in 
case of emotional disturbance, or where the harm is of suchj^na-
ture as necessarily to prevent anything approximating accuracy 
of proof, as when anticipated profits of a business have been pre-
vented. 
The requirements vary with the possibilities for making a rea-
sonably exact estimate of the amount of harm measured in terms 
of money. The following Comments segregate the common types 
of situations that arise. 
b. Harm to body, feelings or reputation. For harm to body, 
feelings or reputation, compensatory damages reasonably pro-
portioned to the intensity and duration of the harm can be 
awarded without proof of amount other than evidence of the na-
ture of the harm. There is no direct correspondence between 
money and harm to the body, feelings or reputation. There is no 
market price for a scar or for loss of hearing since the damages 
are not measured by the amount for which one would be willing 
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to suffer the harm. The discretion of the judge or jury deter-
mines the amount of recovery, the only standard being such an 
amount as a reasonable person would estimate as fair compensa-
tion. In these cases the trier of fact can properly award sub-
stantial damages as compensation for harms that normally flow 
from the tortious injury even without specific proof of their 
existence, such as pain from a blow or humiliation from a scar. 
Evidence to prove that the harm is greater or less than that 
which ordinarily follows is admissible. The most that can be 
done is to note such factors as the intensity of the pain or hu-
miliation, its actual or probable duration and the expectable con-
sequences. Since these factors are all indefinite (see § 905), it is 
impossible to require anything approximating certainty of 
amount even as to past harm. On the recovery for harm to 
feelings threatened from harm already caused by the tortious 
conduct there is even more indefiniteness. (See Comment e). 
It must be noted on the other hand that certain pecuniary harms 
such as loss of earnings may result from harm to the body (see 
S 924) and that as to these reasonable certainty of proof of the 
extent of damage is required. 
Efforts to provide suggestions or formulas for measuring with 
more certainty the amount of damages for pain and suffering 
have met with varying degrees of success. It is consistently 
held to be improper to suggest to the jury that they place them-
selves in the position of the injured person and determine the 
sum of money that they would require to incur his injuries. 
Substantial disagreement has developed among the courts, how-
ever, on the so-called "per-diem argument"—asking the jury to 
estimate the value of the pain and suffering for a day (or some 
other short period of time) and then to multiply that figure by 
the length of time that the pain may be expected to continue. 
Three views are taken: (1) some courts forbid the practice on 
the ground of its potential prejudice in giving the jury an illu-
sion of precision in calculation and in substituting a formula for 
evidence; (2) other courts find the practice not unfair or un-
just in providing a mathematical formula to aid the jury in 
making a reasonable award since the parties should have the 
opportunity to explain the components of the lump sum; and (3) 
still other courts treat the matter as in the sound discretion of 
the trial judge so long as he gives appropriate cautionary instruc-
tions that the formula is not proof and should be treated merely 
as suggestive. There is also a division of authority on whether 
counsel may state to the jury the amount of damages claimed or 
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expected by the plaintiff, but a substantial majority of the courts 
do not treat this as improper. 
c. Harm to chattels or to land. One who converts or de-
stroys a chattel is liable for its value, which normally is the ex-
change value. (See §§911 and 927). If there is no evidence of 
the value of the chattel, damages to a substantial amount can 
not be granted. (See Illustration 1). Even in the matter of 
value there may be serious elements of uncertainty, as when 
there have been no recent sales of similar things in the vicinity. 
When the value to the user is the measure of recovery, especially 
when the subject matter cannot be replaced, the measure of re-
covery is left very largely to the discretion of the trier of fact. 
(See § 911, Comment e). 
When there has been harm to land or structures on land from 
a past invasion, the damages for permanent harm are normally 
the difference between the market value of the land before and 
after the harm, as indicated in § 929. The value thus ascribed 
to the land is ordinarily determined by the opinion of experts, 
which may vary widely, so that the application of the standard is 
often far from certain. In cases in which the plaintiff is living 
upon land affected by a nuisance and hence is allowed to recover 
for inconvenience or discomfort (see jj 929, Comment e), the jury 
is as unrestrained in its estimate of this element of damages as 
in other cases of damages for personal harm. 
When the question is one of the apportionment of a divisible 
harm among two or more causes, each of which is shown to have 
contributed to some extent to the total harm, the rule stated in 
8 433B places upon each defendant the burden of proof for the 
apportionment. This is true, for example, of many cases of pri-
vate nuisance resulting from the flooding of land, or the pollu-
tion of air or water; and it is true occasionally of other types of 
harm. (See § 433B, Comments c and d). When the defendant 
thus has the burden of proof, he is required to sustain it by evi-
dence sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for the apportion-
ment but he is not required to establish with any greater degree 
of definiteness or certainty the exact proportion of the harm 
which he has caused. (See Illustrations 2, 3, 4 and 5) . 
Illustrations: 
1. A intentionally kills B's dog. No evidence is intro-
duced as to the value of the dog. B is entitled only to 
nominal damages, unless the description of the dog by wit-
nesses indicates that it has some substantial value. 
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2. Cattle owned by A and B trespass on the land of C, 
and destroy crops, causing total damage in the amount of 
$3,000. In C's action joining A and B as defendants, no 
evidence is introduced bearing on the question of the extent 
of the harm done by the cattle of each defendant. The bur-
den of proof as to apportionment has not been sustained, and 
A and B are both subject to liability to C in the amount of 
$3,000. 
3. The same facts as in Illustration 2, except that the 
defendants introduce evidence that A's cattle were twice as 
numerous as B's, and that all of the cattle were of the same 
age and general size. On the basis of this evidence, A may 
be held liable for $2,000, and B for $1,000. 
4. A, B and C each operates a mine on a small stream 
flowing through D's land. Each mine dumps refuse into the 
stream and the combined pollution of the stream does harm 
to D's rights as a riparian owner. In an action by D against 
A, no evidence is introduced to show the extent of the harm 
caused by the refuse from each source. The burden of 
proof for apportionment is not sustained and A is subject to 
liability to C for the entire harm. 
5. The same facts as in Illustration 4, except that A in-
troduces evidence showing that the output of refuse from the 
mines is in the following proportions: A, five; B, three; 
and C, two. On the basis of this evidence, A may be held 
liable for 50 per cent of the total harm. 
d. Loss of earnings and profits. As a condition to recovery 
for loss of earnings or for harm to earning capacity, the person 
harmed must offer evidence, convincing to the trier of fact, that 
a significant amount of earnings has been lost, or that his earn-
ing capacity has been significantly harmed. To do this he must 
introduce evidence of the amount of earnings received prior to 
the time of the injury, or the amount that he was capable of 
obtaining, and at least some evidence having a tendency to show 
that he could have earned something during the period in which 
loss of earnings is claimed. (See Illustrations 6 and 7 and § 924, 
Comments c, d and e). 
If there is an interference with intangible rights, such as an 
interference with a business, there may be great difficulty in 
proving the existence or amount of loss with any degree of cer-
tainty. It is necessary to show at least that the right is valuable. 
Thus, if a person has tortiously prevented another from entering 
into or continuing a business or entering into a particular trans-
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action in which there is not only a likelihood of profit but also 
a chance for loss, it is essential to the recovery of compensatory 
damages that the injured person prove that the enterprise was 
or was likely to be profitable and that the chance for profits has 
been interfered with. (See Illustrations 8 and 9). In determin-
ing this, the same elements of proof used in proving the value of 
a chattel are relevant. Thus, if the business is one that has some-
thing approximating a market value, the value before and after 
the loss can be shown. (See Illustration 10). So, too, whether 
or not the business or transaction has a market value, the income 
before and after the wrongful act can be shown. In some cases, 
in order to show that the loss was attributable to the wrongful 
act rather than to other circumstances, proof may be necessary 
that the other conditions continued equally favorable. Ordinari-
ly, however, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it may be 
assumed that similar conditions continued after the tort. (See 
Illustration 11). When the tortfeasor has prevented the begin-
ning of a new business or the prosecution of a single transac-
tion, all factors relevant to the likelihood of the success or lack 
of success of the business or transaction that are reasonably 
provable are to be considered, including general business con-
ditions and the degree of success of similar enterprises. Because 
of a justifiable doubt as to the success of new and untried enter-
prises, more specific evidence of their probable profits is required 
than when the claim is for harm to an established business. (See 
Illustration 12). 
Although the burden is on the injured person to prove with a 
fair degree of certainty that the business or transaction was or 
would have been profitable, it is not fatal to the recovery of sub-
stantial damages that he is unable to prove with definiteness 
the amount of the profits he would have made or the amount of 
harm that the defendant has caused. It is only essential that he 
present such evidence as might reasonably be expected to be 
available under the circumstances. (See Illustrations 13 and 14). 
A physical injury to the owner of a business that is harmed by 
the owner's absence is only indirectly an injury to the business 
and unless the harm to the business was intended, the owner of 
the business is entitled to damages only for harm to his earning 
capacity that may be different from the amount of harm to the 
^business. (See § 924, Comment c). 
Illustrations: 
6. A negligently harms B, a physician, who as a result is 
unable to attend to his patients. No evidence is offered of 
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his income except that he had been practicing medicine in 
a small town for eight years. B is entitled only to nominal 
damages for loss of earnings. 
7. The same facts as in Illustration 6, except that evi-
dence is introduced to show that B's average income for the 
two years preceding the injury was $20,000, and that during 
his incapacity, while he employed a substitute at an expense 
of $10,000 yearly, the receipts from the practice dropped to 
$7,500 yearly. B is entitled to damages for loss of earnings 
based upon this evidence. 
8. A has a contract with B by the terms of which A 
is to arrange for a boxing match between B and C. D 
tortiously causes B to break his contract before A has in-
curred any expenses with reference to it. A is entitled to 
compensatory damages from D only if he proves that it is 
more probable than not that the match would have been 
made by him and would have been a financial success, and 
if his proof offers a reasonable basis for estimating: the pro-
fits. 
9. A contracts with B, a manufacturer, to introduce and 
to sell B's goods for a period of one year. C tortiously causes 
B to refuse to perform the contract. A is entitled to recover 
from C only if he can prove by a preponderance of evidence 
that the profits from the enterprise would have been greater 
than the expenses, and can give a reasonable basis for esti-
mating their amount. 
10. A is conducting a grocery store, renting the premises 
on a month-to-month basis. He has received a standing 
offer of $25,000 from B, a financially responsible person, for 
the stock on hand and good will. Failing to secure the store, 
C fraudulently causes A's landlord to terminate the lease and 
A is ejected. He cannot secure another advantageous loca-
tion for a store in the town. A is entitled to damages from 
C in the amount of at least $25,000, less the value of the 
stock of goods. 
11. While A is operating a boarding house, B makes de-
famatory statements concerning the edibility of the food, 
as a result of which many of A's boarders leave. The profits 
for the six months immediately preceding these statements 
were $200 per week. After the statements there were no 
profits for a period of thirty weeks. In an action for the 
loss caused by the statements, A is entitled to recover the 
amount of profits thus lost, unless B proves that there has 
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been a change of conditions, such as a change in the char-
acter of the neighborhood or of the food offered to the 
boarders, or unless it was unreasonable for A to continue 
to operate the boarding house during this period, in which 
latter event the damages would include an amount equal to 
the value of the business. 
12. A pays B $10,000 for a license to sell in specified ter-
ritory a new drink, produced and extensively advertised by 
B. Before a shipment has been made, C tortiously causes 
B to refuse to make delivery. A is not entitled to substan-
tial damages from C on proof that the gross profit would 
have been 20 per cent., that other drinks have had a ready 
sale in the same locality, that in other localities large quan-
tities of the same drink have been sold, and that in the past 
A has been successful in other enterprises. 
13. A has a contract with B for the introduction into 
Mexico of B's product, A to receive 10 per cent, of the com-
missions obtained by the local agents whom A is to appoint 
and who are to sell the product at a price fixed in the agree-
ment. C, by fraud, prevents A from obtaining agents and 
hence from performing the contract, as a result of which 
B rescinds the contract. A is entitled to recover compensa-
tory damages upon proof that before the tortious conduct 
of C he had established a number of subagencies, that the 
subagents had made a certain number of sales per month at 
the agreed price and that in other sections of Mexico the 
situation was so substantially similar that it would be rea-
sonable to expect that other subagents would make a similar 
number of sales. 
14. A is conducting a manufacturing business in which 
the net profits are approximately $50,000 per year. B, a 
competitor, is guilty of unfair trade practices and the de-
mand for A's goods begins to fall off instead of to increase 
as had been true hitherto. Some of the changes may be as-
cribed to competition by new competitors. The amount of 
harm that has been done by B cannot be told with any sub-
stantial degree of accuracy. A is nevertheless entitled to 
compensatory damages based upon such facts and figures 
as are reasonably available. 
e. Damages for future harm. When an injured person seeks 
to recover for harms that may result in the future, he is entitled 
to damages based upon the probability that harm of one sort or 
another will ensue and upon its probable seriousness if it should 
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ensue. When a person has suffered physical harm that is more 
or less permanent in nature, as stated in § 910, he is entitled to 
recover damages not only for harm already suffered, but also for 
that which probably will result in the future. At the time 
of trial, while some form of harm may be anticipated, its nature, 
extent and duration ordinarily cannot be foretold with accuracy. 
There is no mathematical formula that will determine the chance 
of the harm occurring or that will gauge the monetary equiva-
lent of the chance of loss. This is true with reference to antici-
pated harm to feelings and to earning capacity. This fact does 
not, however, prevent recovery for money damages, even though 
in the great majority of cases the amount will not correspond 
even approximately to the harm that will be suffered, since the 
amount is arrived at by considering probabilities, both favorable 
and unfavorable, that seldom forecast what will happen to a 
single individual. Special rules for estimating the probable loss 
of earnings in the future and the length of time during which 
the losses as well as permanent bodily injuries may continue, in-
cluding the expectancy of life, are stated in 8 924, Comments d 
and e. 
The same principle is applicable in ascertaining the damages 
to be awarded because of the erection of a structure by the de-
fendant because of which future physical damage to the plain-
tiffs land may result. (See § 930). 
/. Interference with a gift or chance for gain. If a person 
can prove that but for the tortious interference of another, he 
would have received a gift or a specific profit from a transaction, 
he is entitled to full damages for the loss that has thus been 
caused to him. (See Illustration 15). On the other hand, in 
many cases it is impossible for this to be proved with any certain-
ty, as when a person is in a class of beneficiaries, one of whom 
would have received a gift but for the wrongful conduct and there 
is no evidence to indicate which one would have been the re-
cipient. In these cases the injured person, in order to recover, 
has the burden of proving that the gift would have been made 
to one of the class; having satisfied this burden, he is then en-
titled to receive an amount commensurate for the chance that he 
had of receiving the gift. (See Illustration 16). ' 
The requirements of certainty are also met when the injured 
person would have had a substantial and measurable chance of a 
profit without chance of loss if the defendant had not acted im-
properly, the damages being based upon the amount of the profit 
that might have resulted and the chance that the injured person 
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had to make it. This situation is to be distinguished from that in 
which there is a substantial chance of loss as well as a chance of 
gain. (See Comment d). 
In cases in which there has been an interference with property 
from which a profit was expected, it may clearly appear at the 
trial that no profit would have been made. If so, the injured per-
son is entitled to, but no more than, the diminution in the value 
of the property caused by the interference, or the total value if 
destroyed. Since, however, this value will normally be taken as 
of the time of the tort (see § 927, conversion of chattels, and 
§§ 928 and 929, harms to land and chattels), damages will be 
awarded proportionate to the chance, as the situation appeared 
at the time of the tort, that profits would be made. (See Illus-
tration 17). When, however, there has been an interference with 
a right that is nontransferable and it subsequently appears that 
the exercise of the right would not have been profitable, the 
plaintiff is not entitled to substantial damages. (See Illustration 
18). 
Illustrations: 
15. A is a favorite nephew of B in whose favor B tells 
C, an attorney, to draw a will, devising a half of B's proper-
ty to A. C, who is B's son and heir, pretending compliance 
with his mother's wishes, intentionally draws an ineffec-
tive will. B dies believing that a half of her property will go 
to A. A is entitled to damages from C to the extent of the 
net value to A of a half of the property of which B died pos-
sessed. 
16. A is one of the three remaining contestants for a 
prize to be awarded in a newspaper popularity contest, all 
three remaining contestants having received substantially 
the same number of votes. For the purpose of discrediting 
A, B, a friend of one of the other contestants, causes A to 
be arrested, thus destroying A's chance of winning the prize, 
$3000. Assuming that there was more than a mere possibil-
ity that A might have won the prize, A is entitled to dam-
ages from B based on the value of the chance that he would 
have received the prize, that is, in the absence of further 
evidence, $1000. 
17. A is a tenant for a year who has planted his crop. B, 
the landlord, tortiously drives him from the land in May, 
at which time the weather and other conditions indicate 
that the crop will be a very profitable one. In August an 
<na.ni . — 
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excessively dry spell burns up all the crops in the immedi-
ate neighborhood. A is nevertheless entitled to recover the 
value of the crop of which he was dispossessed, the value 
being based upon the May prices for the crop. 
18. A is one of three young women who have been select-
ed by popular vote to take screen tests for the purpose of de-
termining which one is to be starred in a picture. B tortious-
ly prevents A from taking the test and another of the con-
testants is selected. Later, however, A is given a screen 
test, as a result of which it is admitted that A could not 
have been successful in the contest. A is not entitled to sub-
stantial damages from B. 
g. Interference with use of land or chattels. When a person 
has deprived another of the use of land or chattels, if the profits 
to be derived from their use cannot be ascertained with sub-
stantial certainty or even if it can now be proved that there would 
have been no profits from the use of the subject matter, the in-
jured person is nevertheless entitled either to interest upon the 
value of the land or chattels or to their rental value during the 
period of deprivation. (See §§ 928-931). Further, the fact that 
there is available this alternative measure of recovery is an ele-
ment in denying recovery for damages based upon uncertain 
proof as to the probability of profits. 
§ 9 1 3 . Interest 
(1) Except when the plaintiff can and does elect the 
restitutional measure of recovery, he is entitled to in-
terest upon the amount found due 
(a) for the taking or detention of land, chattels or 
other subjects of property, or the destruction of any 
legally protected interest in them, when the valuation 
can be ascertained from established market prices, from 
the time adopted for their valuation to the time of judg-
ment, or 
(b) except as stated in Subsection (2), for other 
harms to pecuniary interests from the time of the ac-
crual of the cause of action to the time of judgment, if 
the payment of interest is required to avoid an injus-
tice. 
(2) Interest is not allowed upon an amount found due 
for bodily harm, for emotional distress or for injury to 
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reputation, but the time that has elapsed between the 
harm and the trial can be considered in determining the 
amount of damages. 
Comment on Subsection (1): 
a. Interest, when allowed in actions of tort, is a form of dam-
ages for the deprivation of something of value of which the in-
jured person was deprived by the tortious conduct. In some 
cases, as in the case of money tortiously taken, it represents the 
value of the use; in other cases, interest roughly represents the 
income that would have been received from the property wrong-
fully taken or the income upon an amount of money used by the 
injured person in replacing the subject matter. 
At early common law no interest was allowed in actions of 
tort. This early common law view has been changed, partly by 
statute and partly by judicial decision. Today, interest is recov-
erable upon the value of land or chattels tortiously appropriated 
or destroyed or of land the title to which has been destroyed, 
provided the valuation can be based upon current prices generally 
accepted within a reasonably narrow range of variation. Similar-
ly, interest on the value of land or chattels wrongfully detained 
may be awarded, as an alternative to recovery of the rental value 
or value of the use, as damages for the detention. 
Similarly, interest on the invested capital may be allowed as an 
alternative to other damages that cannot be proved with suf-
ficient specificity to meet the requirement of certainty, as when 
a store is wrongfully caused to close down for a period and lost 
profits are difficult to prove. 
In other cases of harm to land or chattels if the harm occurred 
at a definite time or, if continuing, was ended at a definite time, 
interest may be allowed when the period of time between the harm 
and the judgment is long or when there are other circumstances 
that would make it unjust not to give interest. This is done in 
some states at the discretion of the judge and in other states at 
the discretion of the jury. Ordinarily, if the sum due is sufficient-
ly definite, so that the tortfeasor has reason to know the amount 
he should pay or its approximate amount, it would be unjust not 
to allow interest from the time when he should have made pay-
ment. On the other hand, if the amount is unliquidated, justice 
may not require the payment, particularly if the injured person 
has discouraged settlement by making exorbitant demands or 
has delayed in filing suit. Even when interest is allowable the in-
jured person may, in some cases, have a right to elect, in substi-
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